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ABSTRACT
In this paper, we use the interaction inside adversarial perturbations to explain
and boost the adversarial transferability. We discover and prove the negative cor-
relation between the adversarial transferability and the interaction inside adver-
sarial perturbations. The negative correlation is further verified through different
DNNs with various inputs. Moreover, this negative correlation can be regarded
as a unified perspective to understand current transferability-boosting methods.
To this end, we prove that some classic methods of enhancing the transferability
essentially decease interactions inside adversarial perturbations. Based on this,
we propose to directly penalize interactions during the attacking process, which
significantly improves the adversarial transferability.
1 INTRODUCTION
Adversarial examples of deep neural networks (DNNs) have attracted increasing attention in recent
years (Carlini & Wagner, 2017; Madry et al., 2018). Goodfellow et al. (2014); Liu et al. (2016) ex-
plored the transferability of adversarial perturbations, and used perturbations generated on a source
DNN to attack other target DNNs. Although many methods have been proposed to enhance the
transferability of adversarial perturbations (Dong et al., 2018; Wu et al., 2018; 2020), the essence of
the improvement of the transferability is still unclear.
This paper considers the interaction inside adversarial perturbations as a new perspective to in-
terpret adversarial transferability. Interactions inside adversarial perturbations are defined in game
theory (Michel & Marc, 1999; Shapley, 1953). Given an input sample x ∈ Rn, the adversarial attack
aims to fool the DNN by adding an imperceptible perturbation δ ∈ Rn on x. Each unit in the pertur-
bation map is termed a perturbation unit. Let φi denote the importance of the i-th perturbation unit
δi to attacking. φi is implemented as the Shapley value, which will be explained later. The interac-
tion between perturbation units δi, δj is defined as the change of the i-th unit’s importance φi when
the j-th unit is perturbed w.r.t the case when the j-th unit is not perturbed. If the perturbation δj on
the j-th unit increases the importance φi of the i-th unit, then there is a positive interaction between
δi and δj . If the perturbation δj decreases the importance φi, it indicates a negative interaction.
In this paper, we discover and partially prove the strong negative correlation between the transfer-
ability and the interaction between adversarial perturbation units, i.e. adversarial perturbations with
lower transferability tend to exhibit larger interactions between perturbation units. We verify such a
correlation based on both the theoretical proof and comparative studies. Furthermore, based on the
correlation, we propose to penalize interactions during attacking to improve the transferability.
The background for us to investigate the correlation between adversarial transferability and the in-
teraction is as follows. First, we prove that multi-step attacking usually generates perturbations with
larger interactions than single-step attacking. Second, according to (Xie et al., 2019), multi-step
attacking tends to generate more over-fitted adversarial perturbations with lower transferability than
single-step attacking. We consider that the more dedicated interaction reflects more over-fitting
towards the source DNN, which hurts adversarial transferability. In this way, we propose the hy-
pothesis that the transferability and the interaction are negatively correlated.
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• Comparative studies are conducted to verify this negative correlation through different DNNs.
• Unified explanation. Such a negative correlation provides a unified view to understand current
transferability-boosting methods. We theoretically prove that some classic transferability-boosting
methods (Dong et al., 2018; Wu et al., 2018; 2020) essentially decrease interactions between pertur-
bation units, which also verifies the hypothesis of the negative correlation.
• Boosting adversarial transferability. Based on above findings, we propose a loss to decrease
interactions between perturbation units during attacking, namely the interaction loss, in order to
enhance the adversarial transferability. The effectiveness of the interaction loss further proves the
negative correlation between the adversarial transferability and the interaction inside adversarial
perturbations. Furthermore, we also try to only use the interaction loss to generate perturbations
without the loss for the classification task. We find that such perturbations still exhibit moderate
adversarial transferability for attacking. Such perturbations may decrease interactions encoded by
the DNN, thereby damaging the inference patterns of the input.
Our contributions are summarized as follows. (1) We reveal the negative correlation between the
transferability and the interaction inside adversarial perturbations. (2) We provide a unified view to
understand current transferability-boosting methods. (3) We propose a new loss to penalize interac-
tions inside adversarial perturbations and enhance the adversarial transferability.
2 RELATED WORK
Adversarial transferability. Attacking methods can be roughly divided into two categories, i.e.
white-box attacks (Szegedy et al., 2013; Goodfellow et al., 2014; Papernot et al., 2016; Carlini &
Wagner, 2017; Kurakin et al., 2017; Su et al., 2017; Madry et al., 2018) and black-box attacks (Liu
et al., 2016; Papernot et al., 2017; Chen et al., 2017; Bhagoji et al., 2018; Ilyas et al., 2018; Jiang
et al., 2019). A specific type of the black-box attack is based on the adversarial transferability (Dong
et al., 2018; Wu et al., 2018; Xie et al., 2019; Wu et al., 2020), which transfers adversarial perturba-
tions on a surrogate/source DNN to a target DNN.
Thus, some previous studies focused on the transferability of adversarial attacking. Liu et al. (2016)
demonstrated that non-targeted attacks were easy to transfer, while the targeted attacks were difficult
to transfer. Wu et al. (2018) and Demontis et al. (2019) explored factors influencing the transferabil-
ity, such as network architectures, model capacity, and gradient alignment. Several methods have
been proposed to enhance the transferability of adversarial perturbations. The momentum iterative
attack (MI Attack) (Dong et al., 2018) incorporated the momentum of gradients to boost the transfer-
ability. The variance-reduced attack (VR Attack) (Wu et al., 2018) used the smoothed gradients to
craft perturbations with high transferability. The diversity input attack (DI Attack) (Xie et al., 2019)
applied the adversarial attacking to randomly transformed input images, which included random re-
sizing and padding with a certain probability. The skip gradient method (SGM Attack) (Wu et al.,
2020) used the gradients of the skip connection to improve the transferability. Dong et al. (2019)
proposed the translation-invariant attack (TI Attack) to evade robustly trained DNNs. Li et al. (2020)
used the dropout erosion and the skip connection erosion to improve the transferability.
In comparison, we explain the transferability based on game theory, and discover the negative corre-
lation between the transferability and interactions as a unified explanation for some above methods.
Interaction. The interaction between input variables has been widely investigated. Daria Sorokina
(2008) defined the interaction ofK input variables of additive models. Scott Lundberg (2017) quan-
tified interactions between each pair of input variables for tree-ensemble models. Some studies
mainly focused on interactions to analyze DNNs. Tsang et al. (2018) measured statistical interac-
tions based on DNN weights. Murdoch et al. (2018) proposed to extract interactions in LSTMs
by disambiguating information of different gates, and Singh et al. (2019) extended this method to
CNNs. Jin et al. (2020) quantified the contextual independence of words to hierarchically explain
the LSTMs. In comparison, in this study, we use a different type of interactions based on game
theory, in order to explain and improve the transferability of adversarial perturbations.
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3 THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN TRANSFERABILITY AND INTERACTIONS
Preliminaries: the Shapley value. The Shapley value was first proposed in game theory (Shapley,
1953). Considering multiple players in a game, each player aims to win a high reward. The Shapley
value is considered as a unique and unbiased approach to fairly allocating the total reward gained
by all players to each player (Weber, 1988). The Shapley value satisfies four desirable properties,
i.e. the linearity, dummy, symmetry, and efficiency (please see the Appendix A for details). Let Ω =
{1, 2, . . . , n} denote the set of all players, and let v(·) denote the reward function. v(S) represents
the reward obtained by a set of players S ⊆ Ω. The Shapley value φ(i|Ω) unbiasedly measures the
contribution of the i-th player to the total reward gained by all players in Ω, as follows.∑
i
φ(i|Ω) = v(Ω)−v(∅), φ(i|Ω) =
∑
S⊆Ω\{i}
|S|! (n− |S|−1)!
n!
(v(S∪{i})−v(S)). (1)
Adversarial attack. Given an input sample x ∈ [0, 1]n with the true label y ∈ {1, 2, . . . , C}, we use
h(x) ∈ RC to denote the output of the DNN before the softmax layer. To simplify the story, in this
study, we mainly focus on the untargeted adversarial attack. The goal of the untargeted adversarial
attack is to add a human-imperceptible perturbation δ ∈ Rn on the sample x, and make the DNN
classify the perturbed sample x′ = x+ δ into an incorrect category, i.e. arg maxy′ hy′(x′) 6= y. The
objective of adversarial attacking is usually formulated as follows.
maximize
δ
`(h(x+ δ), y) s.t. ‖δ‖p≤ , x+ δ ∈ [0, 1]n, (2)
where `(h(x+δ), y) is referred to as the classification loss, and  is a constant of the norm constraint.
Please see Appendix C for technical details of solving Equation (2).
3.1 THEORETICAL UNDERSTANDING OF THE ADVERSARIAL ATTACK IN GAME THEORY.
In adversarial attacking, given the perturbation δ ∈ Rn, we use Ω = {1, 2, . . . , n} to denote all
units/dimensions in the perturbation. We use the Shapley value in Equation (1) to measure the
contribution of each perturbation unit i ∈ Ω to the attack. To this end, it requires us to define the
utility of a subset of perturbation units S ⊆ Ω for attacking, which can be formulated as v(S) =
maxy′ 6=y hy′(x + δ(S)) − hy(x + δ(S)), according to Equation (2). hy(·) is the value of the y-th
element of h(·) ∈ RC . δ(S) ∈ Rn is the perturbation which only contains perturbation units in S,
i.e. ∀i ∈ S, δ(S)i = δi; ∀i /∈ S, δ(S)i = 0. In this way, v(Ω) = maxy′ 6=y hy′(x + δ) − hy(x + δ)
denotes the utility of all perturbation units, and v(∅) = maxy′ 6=y hy′(x)−hy(x) denotes the baseline
score without perturbations. Thus, the overall contribution of perturbation units can be measured as
v(Ω)− v(∅). We apply the Shapley value in Equation (1) to assign the overall contribution to each
perturbation unit as
∑
i φ(i|Ω) = v(Ω) − v(∅), where φ(i|Ω) denotes the contribution of the i-th
perturbation unit.
Interactions. Perturbation units do not contribute to the adversarial utility independently. For ex-
ample, perturbation units may form a certain pattern, e.g. an edge in the image. Thus, perturbations
units in the edge must appear together. The absence of a few units in the pattern may invalidate
this pattern. Let us consider two perturbation units i, j. According to (Michel & Marc, 1999), the
interaction between units i, j is defined as the additional contribution as follows.
Iij(δ) = φ(Sij |Ω′)− [φ(i|Ω \ {j}) + φ(j|Ω \ {i})] , (3)
where φ(i|Ω \ {j}) and φ(j|Ω \ {i}) represent the individual contributions of units i and j, respec-
tively, when the perturbation units i, j work individually. Note that φ(i|Ω \ {j}) is computed in the
scenario of considering the unit j always absent.
∑
i φ(i|Ω \ {j}) = v(Ω \ {j})− v(∅), due to the ab-
sence of perturbation unit j. φ(Sij |Ω′) denotes the joint contribution of i, j, when perturbation units
i, j are regarded as a singleton unit Sij = {i, j}. In this case, units i, j are supposed to be always
perturbed or not perturbed simultaneously, and we can consider that there are only n− 1 players in
the game. Thus, the set of all perturbation units is considered as Ω′ = Ω \ {i, j} ∪ Sij . The joint
contribution of Sij is denoted by φ(Sij |Ω′), s.t.
∑
i′∈Ω′\{Sij} φ(i
′|Ω′) + φ(Sij |Ω′) = v(Ω′)− v(∅).
The interaction defined in Equation (3) is equivalent to the change of the i-th unit’s importance φi
when the unit j exists w.r.t the case when the unit j is absent. Please see Appendix D for the proof.
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Figure 1: The negative correlation between the transfer utility and the interaction. The correla-
tion is computed as the Pearson correlation. The blue shade in each subfigure represents the 95%
confidence interval of the linear regression.
If Iij(δ) > 0, it means δi and δj cooperate with each other, i.e. the interaction is positive; if
Iij(δ) < 0, it means δi and δj conflict with each other, i.e. the interaction is negative. The absolute
value of |Iij(δ)| indicates the interaction strength. The interaction is symmetric that Iij(δ) = Iji(δ).
With the definition of interactions, in adversarial attacking, we have the following propositions:
Proposition 1. (Proof in Appendix E) Given an input sample x ∈ Rn and a DNN h(·) trained for
classification, the adversarial perturbation generated by the multi-step attack via gradient descent
is given as δmmulti = α
∑m−1
t=0 ∇x`(h(x + δtmulti), y), where δtmulti denotes the perturbation after the
t-th step of updating, andm is referred to as the total number of steps. The adversarial perturbation
generated by the single-step attack is given as δsingle = αm∇x`(h(x), y). Then, the expectation
of interactions between perturbation units in δmmulti, Ea,b[Iab(δmmulti)], is larger than Ea,b[Iab(δsingle)],
i.e. Ea,b[Iab(δmmulti)] ≥ Ea,b[Iab(δsingle)].
Note that when we compare interactions inside different perturbations, magnitudes of these pertur-
bations should be similar. It is because the comparison of interactions between adversarial perturba-
tions of different magnitudes is not fair. Therefore, we use the step size αm in the single-step attack
to roughly (not accurately) balance the magnitude of perturbations. The fairness is further discussed
in Appendix E.1.
Proposition 1 shows that, in general, adversarial perturbations generated by the multi-step attack
tend to exhibit larger interactions than those generated by the single-step attack. In addition, Ap-
pendix E.4 shows that the multi-step attack usually generates perturbations with larger interactions
than noisy perturbations of the same magnitude. Besides, Xie et al. (2019) demonstrated that the
multi-step attack tends to over-fit the source DNN, which led to low transferability. Intuitively, large
interactions mean a strong cooperative relationship between perturbation units, which indicates the
significant over-fitting towards adversarial perturbations oriented to the source DNN. In this way,
we propose the hypothesis that the adversarial transferability and the interactions inside adversar-
ial perturbations are negatively correlated.
3.2 EMPIRICAL VERIFICATION OF THE NEGATIVE CORRELATION
To verify the negative correlation between the transferability and interactions, we conduct experi-
ments to examine whether adversarial perturbations with low transferability tend to exhibit larger in-
teractions than those perturbations with high transferability. Given a source DNN and an input sam-
ple x, we generate the adversarial example x′ = x+ δ. Then, given a target DNN h(t), we measure
the transfer utility of δ as Transfer Utility = [maxy′ 6=y h
(t)
y′ (x+δ)−h(t)y (x+δ)]−[maxy′ 6=y h(t)y′ (x)−
h
(t)
y (x)] as mentioned in Section 3.1. The interaction is given as Interaction = Ei,j [Iij(δ)], which
is computed on the source DNN. Note that the computational cost of Iij(δ) is NP-hard. However,
we prove that we can simplify the computation of the average interaction over all pairs of units as
follows, which significantly reduces the computational cost. Please see Appendix F for the proof.
Ei,j [Iij(δ)] =
1
n− 1Ei [v(Ω)− v(Ω \ {i})− v({i}) + v(∅)] . (4)
Using the validation set of the ImageNet dataset (Russakovsky et al., 2015), we generate adversarial
perturbations on four types of DNNs, including ResNet-34/152(RN-34/152) (He et al., 2016) and
4
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DenseNet-121/201(DN-121/201) (Huang et al., 2017). We transfer adversarial perturbations gener-
ated on each ResNet to DenseNets. Similarly, we also transfer adversarial perturbations generated
on each DenseNet to ResNets. Figure 1 shows the negative correlation between the transfer utility
and the interaction. Each subfigure corresponds to a specific pair of source DNN and target DNN.
In each subfigure, each point represents the average transfer utility and the average interaction of ad-
versarial perturbations through all testing images. Different points represent the average interaction
and the average transfer utility computed using different hyper-parameters. Given an input image x,
adversarial perturbations are generated by solving the relaxed form of Equation (2) via the gradient
descent, i.e. minδ −`(h(x + δ), y) + c · ‖δ‖pp s.t. x + δ ∈ [0, 1]n, where c ∈ R is a scalar. In this
way, we gradually change the value of c and set different values of p1 as different hyper-parameters
to generate different adversarial perturbations, thereby drawing different points in each subfigure.
Fair comparisons require adversarial perturbations generated with different hyper-parameters c to be
comparable with each other. Thus, we select a constant τ and take ‖δ‖2= τ as the stopping criteria
of all adversarial attacks. The selection of τ is discussed in Appendix H.
4 UNIFIED UNDERSTANDING OF TRANSFERABILITY-BOOSTING ATTACKS
In this section, we prove that some classical methods of improving the adversarial transferability es-
sentially decrease interactions between perturbation units, although these methods are not originally
designed to decrease the interaction.
• VR Attack (Wu et al., 2018) smooths the classification loss with the Gaussian noise during
attacking. In the VR Attack, the gradient of the input sample is computed as follows. gt =
Eξ∼N (0,σ2I) [∇x`(h(x+ δt + ξ), y)]. The following proposition proves that the VR Attack is prone
to decrease interactions inside perturbation units.
Proposition 2. (Proof in Appendix I) Given an input image x ∈ Rn and a DNN h(·)
trained for classification, the adversarial perturbation generated by the multi-step attack is
given as δmmulti = α
∑m−1
t=0 ∇x`(h(x + δtmulti), y). The adversarial perturbation generated by
the VR Attack is computed as δmvr = α
∑m−1
t=0 ∇x ˆ`(h(x + δtvr), y), where ˆ`(h(x + δtvr), y) =
Eξ∼N (0,σ2I) [`(h(x+ δtvr + ξ), y)]. Perturbation units of δmvr tend to exhibit smaller interactions
than δmulti, i.e. ExEa,b[Iab(δmvr )] ≤ ExEa,b[Iab(δmmulti)].
Besides the theoretical proof, we also conduct experiments to compare interactions of perturbation
units generated by the baseline multi-step attack (implemented as (Madry et al., 2018)) with those
of perturbation units generated by the VR Attack. Table 4 shows that the VR Attack exhibits lower
interactions between perturbation units than the baseline multi-step attack.
• MI Attack (Dong et al., 2018) incorporates the momentum of gradients when updating the ad-
versarial perturbation. In the MI Attack, the gradient used in step t is computed as follows.
gt = µ · gt−1 +∇x`
(
h
(
x+ δt−1
)
, y
)
/
∥∥∇x` (h (x+ δt−1) , y)∥∥1.
Note that the original MI Attack and the multi-step attack cannot be directly compared, since that
magnitudes of the generated perturbations cannot be fairly controlled. The value of interactions is
sensitive to the magnitude of perturbations. Comparing perturbations with different magnitudes is
not fair. Thus, we slightly revise the MI Attack as ∀t > 0, gtmi = µgt−1mi + (1− µ)∇x`(h(x +
δt−1mi ), y); g
0
mi = 0, where µ = (t− 1)/t. We investigate the interaction of adversarial perturbations
generated by the original multi-step attack and the MI Attack. We prove the following proposition,
which shows that the MI Attack decreases the interaction between perturbation units in most cases.
Proposition 3. (Proof in Appendix J) Given an input sample x ∈ Rn and a DNN h(·) trained for
classification, the adversarial perturbation generated by the multi-step attack is given as δmmulti =
α
∑m−1
t=0 ∇x`(h(x + δtmulti), y). The adversarial perturbation generated by the multi-step attack
incorporating the momentum is computed as δmmi = α
∑m−1
t=0 g
t
mi. Perturbation units of δ
m
mi exhibit
smaller interactions than δmmulti, i.e. Ea,b[Iab(δmmi)] ≤ Ea,b[Iab(δmmulti)].
1We set p = 2 as the setting 1, and p = 5 as the setting 2. To this end, the performance of adversarial
perturbations is not the key issue in the experiment. Instead, we just randomly set the p value to examine
the trustworthiness of the negative correlation under various attacking conditions (even in extreme attacking
conditions).
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Figure 2: Visualization of interactions between neighboring perturbation units generated with and
without the interaction loss. The color in the visualization is computed as color[i] ∝ Ej∈Ni [Iij(δ)],
where Ni denotes the set of adjacent perturbation units of the perturbation unit i. Here, we ignore
interactions between non-adjacent units to simplify the visualization. It is because adjacent units
usually encode much more significant interactions than other units. The interaction loss forces the
perturbation to encode more negative interactions.
• SGM Attack (Wu et al., 2020) exploits the gradient information of the skip connection in ResNets
to improve the transferability of adversarial perturbations. The SGM Attack revises the gradient in
the backpropagation, which can be considered as to add a specific dropout operation in the back-
propagation. We notice that Zhang et al. (2020) prove that the dropout operation can decrease the
significance of interactions, so as to decrease the significance of the over-fitting of DNNs. Thus, this
also proves that the SGM Attack decreases interactions between perturbation units.
Besides the theoretical proof, we also conduct experiments to compare interactions of perturbation
units generated by the baseline multi-step attack (implemented as Madry et al. (2018)) with those
of perturbation units generated by the SGM Attack. Table 4 shows that the SGM Attack exhibits
lower interactions than the baseline multi-step attack.
5 THE INTERACTION LOSS FOR TRANSFERABILITY ENHANCEMENT
Interaction loss. Based on findings in previous sections, we propose a loss to directly penalize
interactions during attacking, in order to improve the transferability of adversarial perturbations.
Based on Equation (2), we jointly optimize the classification loss and the interaction loss to generate
adversarial perturbations. This method is termed the interaction-reduced attack (IR Attack).
max
δ
[`(h(x+ δ), y)− λ`interaction], `interaction = Ei,j [Iij(δ)] s.t. ‖δ‖p≤ , x+ δ ∈ [0, 1]n, (5)
where `interaction is the interaction loss, and λ is a constant weight for the interaction loss. Although
the computation of the interaction loss can be simplified according to Equation (4), the computa-
tional cost of the interaction loss is intolerable, when the dimension of images is high. Therefore, as
a trade-off between the accuracy and the computational cost, we divide the input image into 16× 16
grids. We measure and penalize interactions at the grid level, instead of the pixel level. Figure 2 vi-
sualizes interactions between adjacent perturbation units at the grid level generated with and without
the interaction loss.
Experiments. For implementation, we generated adversarial perturbations on six different source
DNNs, including Alexnet (Krizhevsky et al., 2012), VGG-16 (Simonyan & Zisserman, 2015),
ResNet-34/152 (RN-34/152) (He et al., 2016) and DenseNet-121/201 (DN-121/201) (Huang et al.,
2017). For each source DNN, we tested the transferability of the generated perturbations on seven
target DNNs, including VGG-16, ResNet-152 (RN-152), DenseNet-201 (DN-201), SENet-154 (SE-
154) (Hu et al., 2018), InceptionV3 (IncV3) (Szegedy et al., 2016), InceptionV4 (IncV4) (Szegedy
et al., 2017), and Inception-ResNetV2 (IncResV2) (Szegedy et al., 2017). Besides above seven
unsecured target DNNs, we also used three secured target models for testing, which were learned
via ensemble adversarial training: IncV3ens3 (ensemble of three IncV3 networks), IncV3ens4 (en-
semble of four IncV3 networks), and IncResV2ens3 (ensemble of three IncResV2 networks), which
were released by Trame`r et al. (2017).
Besides above adversarial transferring from a single-source model, we also conducted the proposed
IR Attack in the scenario of the ensemble-based attacking (Liu et al., 2016), in order to generate
adversarial perturbations on the ensemble of RN-34, RN-152, and DN-121.
Baselines. The first baseline method (Madry et al., 2018) directly solved the Equation (2), which had
been simply termed the Baseline (this baseline method for attacking was also called the PGD Attack,
6
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Table 1: The success rates of L∞ and L2 black-box attacks crafted by the baseline attack (Madry
et al., 2018) and IR Attack methods on seven source models, including AlexNet, VGG16, RN-
34/152, DN-121/201, the ensemble model (RN-34+RN-152+DN-121), against seven target models.
Transferability of adversarial perturbations can be enhanced by penalizing interactions.
Source Method
L
∞
at
ta
ck
VGG16 RN-152 DN-201 SE-154 IncV3 IncV4 IncResV2
L
2
at
ta
ck
VGG16 RN-152 DN-201 SE-154 IncV3 IncV4 IncResV2
AlexNet
Baseline 63.4 28.0 34.7 28.1 26.6 24.4 17.9 83.6 59.7 58.1 53.4 535 46.1 44.3
IR Attack 77.8 42.3 48.5 42.0 44.9 37.4 30.1 90.4 70.4 75.7 67.9 72.9 61.0 57.4
VGG16
Baseline – 45.2 51.8 55.7 40.3 49.5 31.7 – 75.7 81.3 82.3 74.7 80.1 31.7
IR Attack – 64.4 69.5 69.9 53.7 69.6 48.8 – 85.5 87.9 89.4 84.7 86.7 80.1
RN-34
Baseline 66.6 59.6 65.4 36.5 29.4 24.2 23.9 87.4 85.8 88.1 65.7 61.5 59.4 53.5
IR Attack 85.4 85.1 86.0 65.4 56.4 54.2 49.1 95.0 94.2 96.1 85.4 83.7 79.7 78.2
RN-152
Baseline 55.5 – 63.6 40.4 26.0 27.7 22.3 – – – – – – –
IR Attack 71.6 – 80.6 64.0 53.6 50.3 48.0 – – – – – – –
DN-121
Baseline 67.3 66.3 88.6 44.8 35.5 38.3 29.1 88.2 87.1 96.4 73.8 66.9 64.9 61.1
IR Attack 83.5 85.2 95.3 72.2 62.4 63.0 56.2 93.0 92.9 97.4 87.2 84.1 83.3 81.5
DN-201
Baseline 64.4 72.7 – 51.3 44.4 37.6 37.6 – – – – – – –
IR Attack 75.7 85.4 – 73.6 59.8 63.0 56.6 – – – – – – –
Ensemble
model
Baseline 87.6 99.9 96.8 78.3 67.6 60.5 59.1 – – – – – – –
IR Attack 92.3 94.1 94.0 86.2 80.6 78.0 78.4 – – – – – – –
Table 2: Transferability against the secured models: the success rates of L∞ black-box attacks
crafted on RN-34 and DN-121 source models against three secured models.
Source Method IncV3ens3 IncV3ens4 IncResens3 Source Method IncV3ens3 IncV3ens4 IncResens3
RN-34
Baseline 9.8 10.5 5.4
DN-121
Baseline 13.8 13.1 7.9
IR 29.8 23.6 14.7 IR 26.0 24.1 15.9
TI3 22.1 21.5 16.1 TI3 28.1 27.5 21.2
TI3 + IR 34.1 33.1 23.7 TI3 + IR 40.9 51.0 30.6
which was widely used for adversarial attacks). Besides this baseline attack, the other four baselines
were the MI Attack (Dong et al., 2018), the VR Attack (Wu et al., 2018), the SGM Attack (Wu
et al., 2020), and the TI Attack (Dong et al., 2019). Our method was implemented according to
Equation (5), namely the IR Attack. Because the SGM Attack was one of the top-ranked meth-
ods of boosting the adversarial transferability, we further added the interaction loss `interaction to the
SGM Attack as another implementation of our method (namely the SGM+IR Attack). Moreover, as
Section 4 states, the MI Attack, VR Attack, and SGM Attack also decrease interactions during at-
tacking. Thus, we combined the IR Attack with all these interaction-reducing techniques together as
a new implementation of our method, namely the HybridIR Attack. All attacks were conducted with
100 steps 2 on the validation set in the ImageNet dataset. We set  = 16/255 for the L∞ attack and
 = 16
√
n/255 for the L2 attack, where n was the dimension of the image. The step size was set to
2/255 for all attacks. Considering the efficiency of signal processing in DNNs with different depths,
we set λ = 1 for the IR Attack, when the source DNN was ResNet, and set λ = 2, for other source
DNNs. To enable fair comparisons, the transferability of each baseline was computed based on the
best adversarial perturbation during the 100 steps via the leave-one-out (LOO) validation. Please
see the Appendix M for the motivation and the evidence of the LOO evaluation of transferability.
Table 1 reports the success rates of the baseline attack (PGD (Madry et al., 2018)) and the IR Attack.
Compared with the baseline attack, the transferability was significantly improved by the interaction
loss on various source models against different target models. Let us focus on the L∞ attack. For
most source models and target models, the transferability enhancement brought by the interaction
loss was more than 10%. In particular, when the source DNN and the target DNN were DN-201 and
IncV4, respectively, the baseline attack achieved the transferability of 37.6%. With the interaction
loss, the transferability was improved to 63.0% (> 25% gain). Besides, as Table 2 shows, our in-
teraction loss also improved the transferability against the secured target DNNs. Such improvement
further verified the negative correlation between transferability and interactions. Table 3 shows the
improvement of the transferability obtained by the interaction loss on other attacking methods. The
interaction loss could further boost the transferability of state-of-the-art transfer attacks. Without
the interaction loss, the highest transferability made by the SGM Attack against the IncResV2 was
2Previous studies usually set the number of steps to 10 or 20. Here, we set the number of steps to 100
together with the leave-one-out validation for fair comparisons of different attacks.
3The TI Attack was designed oriented to the secured DNNs which were robustly trained via adversarial
training. Thus, we applied the TI Attack to the secured models in Table 2.
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Table 3: The success rates of L∞ black-box attacks crafted by different methods on four source
models (RN-34/152, DN-121/201) against seven target models.
Method VGG16 RN152 DN201 SE154 IncV3 IncV4 IncResV2 Method VGG16 RN152 DN201 SE154 IncV3 IncV4 IncResV2
R
N
-3
4
MI 78.3 68.5 73.7 48.9 46.5 37.1 35.3
D
N
-1
21
MI 80.6 72.8 91.6 61.0 54.1 48.9 42.2
VR 89.0 87.5 90.0 60.8 56.8 58.3 48.9 VR 91.5 89.3 98.6 74.1 74.9 79.0 71.1
SGM 92.4 89.7 89.1 69.2 65.3 59.6 53.6 SGM 88.6 87.0 98.5 77.4 64.6 62.8 61.7
SGM + IR 95.4 92.0 93.7 72.4 68.6 65.4 62.5 SGM + IR 91.6 90.1 94.3 86.7 77.4 79.5 77.5
HybridIR 96.5 95.3 95.3 80.6 76.7 73.9 69.8 HybridIR 96.7 96.8 99.1 91.4 88.3 88.7 86.9
R
N
-1
52
MI 69.7 – 73.4 52.7 46.1 40.0 33.9
D
N
-2
01
MI 76.4 75.6 – 65.4 53.7 48.8 45.6
VR 83.1 – 90.8 70.7 68.1 62.1 60.4 VR 88.5 89.0 – 77.4 77.6 76.3 71.8
SGM 87.7 – 90.1 74.3 64.0 60.5 57.1 SGM 87.1 93.5 – 83.0 72.0 71.9 68.2
SGM + IR 92.6 – 92.8 80.3 69.2 67.4 64.0 SGM + IR 89.1 91.1 – 86.0 82.0 80.6 81.2
HybridIR 95.8 – 97.0 84.0 79.1 78.1 75.7 HybridIR 94.3 96.5 – 91.6 89.5 88.6 86.5
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Figure 3: (a) The success rates of black-box attacks with the IR Attack using different values of λ.
The success rates increased, when the value of λ increased. (b) The transferability of adversarial
perturbations generated by only using the interaction loss (without the classification loss). Such
adversarial perturbations still exhibited moderate adversarial transferability. Points localized at the
last epoch represent the transferability of noise perturbations as the baseline.
68.2% (when the source is DN-201). When the interaction loss was added, the transferability was
improved to 81.2% (13% gain). Moreover, the HybridIR Attack, which combined all methods of
reducing interactions together, improved success rates from the range of 48.9%∼98.5% to the range
of 69.8%∼99.1%.
Effects of the interaction loss. We tested the transferability of perturbations generated by the IR
Attack with different weights of the interaction loss λ. In particular, the baseline attack can be
considered as the IR Attack when λ = 0. We conducted attacks on two source DNNs (RN-34,
DN-121), and transferred adversarial perturbations to seven target DNNs (VGG16, RN-152, DN-
201, SE-154, IncV3, IncV4, IncResV2). The attacks were conducted with 100 steps2 on validation
images in ImageNet . Figure 3 (a) shows the black-box success rates with different values of λ. The
transferability of the IR Attack increased along with the increase of the weight λ.
Attack only with the interaction loss. To further understand the effects of the interaction loss, we
generated perturbations by exclusively using the interaction loss (without the classification loss). We
used the RN-34 and DN-121 as source DNNs and tested the transferability on seven target DNNs.
The attacks were conducted with 100 steps2 on ImageNet validation images. Figure 3 (b) shows the
curve of the transferability in different epochs. We compared such adversarial perturbations with
noise perturbations generated as  · sign(noise), where noise ∼ N (0, σ2I), and  = 16/255, which
was the same as the value used in the L∞ attack. We found that perturbations generated by only
using the interaction loss still exhibited moderate adversarial transferability. This phenomenon may
be explained as that such perturbations decrease most interactions in the DNN, thereby damaging
the inference patterns in the input image.
6 CONCLUSION
In this paper, we have analyzed the transferability of adversarial perturbations from the perspective
of interactions based on game theory. We have proved that the multi-step attack tends to generate
adversarial perturbations with large interactions. We have discovered and partially proved the neg-
ative correlation between the transferability and interactions inside adversarial perturbations. I.e.
adversarial perturbations with higher transferability usually exhibit more negative interactions. We
have proved that some classical methods of enhancing the transferability essentially decrease inter-
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actions between perturbation units, which provides a unified view to understand the enhancement
of transferability. Moreover, we propose a new loss to directly penalize interactions between pertur-
bation units during attacking, which significantly improves the transferability of previous methods.
Furthermore, we have found that adversarial perturbations generated only using the interaction loss
without the classification loss still exhibited moderate transferability, which provides a new perspec-
tive to understand the transferability of adversarial perturbations.
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A FOUR PROPERTIES OF SHAPLEY VALUES
Let Ω = {1, 2, . . . , n} denote the set of all players, and the reward function is v. Without ambiguity,
we use φ(i|Ω) to denote the Shapley value of the player i in the game with all players Ω and reward
function v, which is given as follows.
φ(i|Ω) =
∑
S⊆Ω\{i}
|S|! (n− |S|−1)!
n!
(v(S ∪ {i})− v(S)). (6)
The Shapley value satisfies the following four properties (Weber, 1988):
• Linearity property: If there are two games and the corresponding reward functions are v and w, i.e.
v(S) and w(S) measure the reward obtained by players in S in these two games. Let φv(i|Ω) and
φw(i|Ω) denote the Shapley value of the player i in the game v and gamew, respectively. If these two
games are combined into a new game, and the reward function becomes reward(S) = v(S)+w(S),
then the Shapley value comes to be φv+w(i|Ω) = φv(i|Ω) + φw(i|Ω) for each player i in Ω.
• Dummy property: A player i ∈ Ω is referred to as a dummy player if ∀S ⊆ Ω\{i}, v(S ∪ {i}) =
v(S) + v({i}). In this way, φ(i|Ω) = v({i}) − v(∅), which means that player i plays the game
independently.
• Symmetry property: If ∀S ⊆ Ω \ {i, j}, v(S ∪{i}) = v(S ∪{j}), then Shapley values of player i and
j are equal, i.e. φ(i|Ω) = φ(j|Ω) .
• Efficiency property: The sum of each individual’s Shapley value is equal to the reward won by
the coalition N , i.e.
∑
i φ(i|Ω) = v(Ω) − v(∅). This property guarantees the overall reward can be
allocated to each player in the game.
B COMPARISONS BETWEEN INTERACTIONS INSIDE PERTURBATIONS OF
DIFFERENT ATTACKS
Table 4: The average interaction inside adversarial perturbations generated by different attacks.
Method RN-34 RN-152 DN-121 DN-201
Baseline (PGD Attack) 0.422 0.926 0.909 0.784
SGM Attack -0.012 0.037 0.395 0.308
VR Attack 0.097 0.270 0.242 0.137
We have theoretically proved that some classical attacking methods of boosting the adversarial trans-
ferability essentially decrease interactions inside perturbations. Besides the theoretical proof in
Appendix J and Appendix I, we also conduct experiments to compare interactions of perturbation
units when we generate adversarial perturbations with and without these attacking methods. Such
experiments further verify that these methods of boosting the transferability essentially decrease in-
teractions. We conduct attacks with the validation set in the ImageNet dataset on four DNNs, and
measure the average interaction inside perturbation units. As Table 4 shows, the SGM Attack and
the VR Attack decrease interactions inside perturbations.
C ADVERSARIAL ATTACK
In general, the objective of adversarial attacking can be formulated as the following optimization
problem.
maximize
δ
`(h(x+ δ), y) s.t. ‖δ‖p≤ , x+ δ ∈ [0, 1]n, (7)
where `(h(x+ δ), y) is the classification loss. There are many ways to solve the above optimization
problem under different norm constraints ‖·‖p (Goodfellow et al., 2014; Carlini & Wagner, 2017;
Kurakin et al., 2017; Madry et al., 2018; Chen et al., 2018b).
Optimization-based approach. One approach to approximately solving Equation (7) is to solve
the following relaxed form:
minimize
δ
{−`(h(x+ δ), y) + c · ‖δ‖p} s.t. x+ δ ∈ [0, 1]n, (8)
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where c > 0 is a scalar constant to balance the classification loss and the norm constraint. Szegedy
et al. (2013); Carlini & Wagner (2017) have demonstrated the effectiveness of this method.
Projected gradient descent (PGD) (Madry et al., 2018). The PGD Attack is usually considered
as one of the simplest and the most widely used baseline for adversarial attacking. In this paper,
this method is called the Baseline. The PGD Attack directly optimizes the classification loss in
Equation (7). Considering the norm constraint, after each step of updating, the PGD Attack projects
the adversarial perturbation δ back to the -ball, if the perturbation goes beyond the ball.
PGD updates adversarial perturbations in each step with the following equation:
δt+1 =
Π
(∞)
 (δt + α · sign (∇` (h (x+ δt) , y))) , p = +∞
Π
(2)

(
δt + α · ∇`(h(x+δ
t),y)
‖∇`(h(x+δt),y)‖2
)
, p = 2,
(9)
where δt denotes the perturbation of the t-th step. Π(∞) and Π
(2)
 are projection operations, which
project the perturbation δ back to the -ball, if the perturbation goes beyond the ball. α is the step
size. Given δ ∈ Rn, we have:
Π(∞) (δi) =
{
 · sign(δi), if |δi|> 
δi, if |δi|≤  , Π
(2)
 (δ) =
{
 δ‖δ‖2 , if ‖δ‖2 > 
δ, if ‖δ‖2 ≤ 
. (10)
Interaction-reduced attack (IR Attack). Note that our interaction-reduced attack (IR Attack) uses
the similar way as PGD Attack to iteratively update perturbations. The objective function of IR
Attack is given as follows.
maximize
δ
[`(h(x+ δ), y)− λ · Ei,j [Iij(δ)] ] s.t. ‖δ‖p≤ , x+ δ ∈ [0, 1]n,
We optimize the objective of IR Attack as follows.
δt+1 =
Π
(∞)
 (δt + α · sign [∇` (h (x+ δt) , y)− λ · ∇Eij(δt))] , p = +∞
Π
(2)

(
δt + α · ∇`(h(x+δ
t),y)−λ·∇Eij(δt)
‖∇`(h(x+δt),y)−λ·∇Eij(δt)‖2
)
, p = 2
(11)
D EQUIVALENT FORMS OF THE INTERACTION
In Section 3.1, the interaction between units i, j is defined as the additional contribution as follows.
Iij(δ) = φ(Sij |Ω′)− [φ(i|Ω \ {j}) + φ(j|Ω \ {i})] , (12)
where φ(i|Ω \ {j}) and φ(j|Ω \ {i}) represent the individual contributions of units i and j, re-
spectively, when the perturbation units i, j work individually. φ(Sij |Ω′) denotes the joint contri-
bution of i, j, when perturbation units i, j are regarded as a singleton unit Sij = {i, j}. Note that∑
i φ(i|Ω \ {j}) = v(Ω \ {j})− v(∅), due to the absence of perturbation unit j.
In Section 1, the interaction between perturbation units δi, δj is defined as the change of the impor-
tance φi of the i-th unit when the j-th unit δj is perturbed w.r.t the case when the j-th unit δj is not
perturbed. If the perturbation δj on the j-th unit increases the importance φi of the i-th unit, then
there is a positive interaction between δi and δj . If the perturbation δj decreases the importance φi,
it indicates a negative interaction. Mathematically, this definition can be written as follows.
I ′ij(δ) = φi,w/ j − φi,w/o j , (13)
where φi,w/ j represents the importance of δi, when δj is always present; φi,w/o j represents the
importance of δi, when δj is always absent.
In this section, we aim to prove that the interaction in Equation (12) is equal to the interaction in
Equation (13), i.e. Iij(δ) = I ′ij(δ).
Proof. In Equation (12), the interaction is give as φ(Sij |Ω′)− [φ(i|Ω \ {j}) + φ(j|Ω \ {i})], where
φ(Sij |Ω′), φ(i|Ω \ {j}), and φ(j|Ω \ {i}) are implemented as Shapley values.
φ(Sij |Ω′) =
∑
S⊆Ω\{i,j}
|S|! (n− |S|−2)!
(n− 1)! (v(S ∪ {i, j})− v(S)),
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where Sij = {i, j} represents the coalition of perturbation units i, j. In this game, because pertur-
bation units i, j are regarded as a singleton player, we can consider there are only n − 1 players in
the game, and consequently the set of players changes to Ω′ = Ω \ {i, j} ∪ Sij .
The individual contribution of perturbation unit i, when perturbation unit j is absent, is given as
follows.
φ(i|Ω \ {j}) =
∑
S⊆Ω\{i,j}
|S|! (n− |S|−2)!
(n− 1)! (v(S ∪ {i})− v(S)).
In this game, because the perturbation unit j is always absent, we can consider there are only n− 1
players in the game. Consequently the set of players changes to Ω \ {j}.
The individual contribution of perturbation unit j, when perturbation unit i is absent, is given as
follows.
φ(j|Ω \ {i}) =
∑
S⊆Ω\{i,j}
|S|! (n− |S|−2)!
(n− 1)! (v(S ∪ {j})− v(S)).
In this game, because the perturbation unit i is always absent, we can consider there are only n− 1
players in the game. Consequently the set of players changes to Ω \ {i}.
In this way,
Iij(δ)
= φ(Sij |Ω′)− (φ(i|Ω \ {j}) + φ(j|Ω \ {i}))
=
∑
S⊆Ω\{i,j}
|S|! (n− |S|−2)!
(n− 1)! {v(S∪{i, j})−v(S)− [v(S∪{i})−v(S)+v(S∪{j})−v(S)])}
=
∑
S⊆Ω\{i,j}
|S|! (n− |S|−2)!
(n− 1)! (v(S ∪ {i, j})− v(S ∪ {j})− v(S ∪ {i}) + v(S)).
In Equation (13), the interaction is given as φi,w/ j − φi,w/o j . Here, φi,w/ j represents the specific
game, in which the unit j is always present. In this case, we only need to consider the presence and
absence of other n− 1 players, except for the unit j. φi,w/o j represents the specific game, in which
the unit j is always absent. In this case, we also only need to consider the presence and absence
of other n − 1 players, except for the unit j. φi,w/ j and φi,w/o j are also implemented as Shapley
values. When perturbation unit j is always present, the contribution of perturbation unit i is given
as follows.
φi,w/ j =
∑
S⊆Ω\{i,j}
|S|! (n− |S|−2)!
(n− 1)! (v(S ∪ {i, j})− v(S ∪ {j})).
In this game, because the perturbation unit j is always present, we can consider there are only n− 1
players.
When perturbation unit j is always absent, the contribution of perturbation unit i is given as follows.
φi,w/o j =
∑
S⊆Ω\{i,j}
|S|! (n− |S|−2)!
(n− 1)! (v(S ∪ {i})− v(S)).
In this game, because the perturbation unit j is always absent, we can consider there are only n− 1
players.
In this way,
I ′ij(δ) = φi,w/ j − φi,w/o j
=
∑
S⊆Ω\{i,j}
|S|! (n− |S|−2)!
(n− 1)! (v(S ∪ {i, j})− v(S ∪ {j})− v(S ∪ {i}) + v(S)).
Therefore, we have
Iij(δ) = I
′
ij(δ).
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E PROOF OF PROPOSITION 1
To simplify the problem setting, we do not consider some tricks in adversarial attacking, such as gra-
dient normalization and the clip operation. In multi-step attacking, the final perturbation generated
after t steps is given as follows.
δtmulti
def
= α
t−1∑
t′=0
∇x`(h(x+ δt′multi), y),
where α represents the step size, and `(h(x), y) is referred as the classification loss.
To simplify the notation, we use g(x) to denote ∇x`(h(x), y), i.e. g(x) def= ∇x`(h(x), y). Further-
more, we define the update of the perturbation with the multi-step attack at each step t as follows.
∆xtmulti
def
= α · g(x+ δt−1multi). (14)
In this way, the perturbation can be written as follows.
δtmulti = ∆x
1
multi + ∆x
2
multi + · · ·+ ∆xt−1multi. (15)
Lemma 1. Given the sample x ∈ Rn and the adversarial perturbation δ ∈ Rn, we use Ω =
{1, 2, . . . , n} to denote the set of all perturbation units. The score function is denoted by v(S) =
L(x + δ(S)), where δ(S) satisfies ∀i ∈ S, δ(S)i = δi;∀i /∈ S, δ(S)i = 0. The Shapley interaction
between perturbation units a, b can be written as Iab = δaHab(x)δb + Rˆ2(δ), where Hab(x) =
∂L(x)
∂xa∂xb
represents the element of the Hessian matrix, and Rˆ2(δ) denotes terms with elements in δ of
higher than the second order.
Proof. The Shapley interaction between perturbation units a, b is
Iab(δ) =
∑
S⊆Ω\{a,b}
|S|! (n− |S|−2)!
(n− 1)! [v(S ∪ {a, b})− v(S ∪ {b})− v(S ∪ {a}) + v(S)],
where v(S) = L(x + δ(S)). Here, the classification loss can be approximated as L(x + δ) =
L(x) + gT (x)δ + 12δ
TH(x)δ +R2(δ) using Taylor series. Thus, ∀S′ ⊆ Ω,
v(S′) = L(x) +
∑
a∈S′
ga(x)δa +
1
2
∑
a,b∈S′
δaHab(x)δ
(S′)
b +R
S′
2 (δ).
where RS
′
2 (δ) denotes terms with elements in δ
(S′) of higher than the second order.
In this way, the Shapley interaction Iab is given as
Iab(δ) =
∑
S⊆Ω\{a,b}
|S|! (n− |S|−2)!
(n− 1)! [v(S ∪ {a, b})− v(S ∪ {b})− v(S ∪ {a}) + v(S)]
=
∑
S⊆Ω\{a,b}
|S|! (n− |S|−2)!
(n− 1)! {[L(x)+∑
a′∈S∪{a,b}
ga′(x)δa′ +
1
2
∑
a′,b′∈S∪{a,b}
δa′Ha′b′(x)δb′ +R
(S∪{a,b})
2 (δ)]
− [L(x) +
∑
a′∈S∪{b}
ga′(x)δa′ +
1
2
∑
a′,b′∈S∪{b}
δa′Ha′b′(x)δb′ +R
(S∪{b})
2 (δ)]
− [L(x) +
∑
a′∈S∪{a}
ga′(x)δa′ +
1
2
∑
a′,b′∈S∪{a}
δa′Ha′b′(x)δb′ +R
(S∪{a})
2 (δ)]
+ L(x) +
∑
a′∈S
ga′(x)δa′ +
1
2
∑
a′,b′∈S
δa′Ha′b′(x)δb′ +R
(S)
2 (δ)}
16
preprint
=
∑
S⊆Ω\{a,b}
|S|! (n− |S|−2)!
(n− 1)! {δaHab(x)δb}
+
∑
S⊆Ω\{a,b}
|S|! (n− |S|−2)!
(n− 1)! [R
(S∪{a,b}
2 (δ))−R(S∪{a})2 (δ)−R(S∪{b})2 (δ) +R(S)2 (δ)]︸ ︷︷ ︸
Rˆ2(δ)
=

n−2∑
s=0
∑
S⊆Ω\{a,b},
|S|=s
s! (n− s− 2)!
(n− 1)! [δaHab(x)δb]
+ Rˆ2(δ)
=
{
n−2∑
s=0
(n− 2)!
s! (n− s− 2)!
s! (n− s− 2)!
(n− 1)! [δaHab(x)δb]
}
+ Rˆ2(δ)
= δaHab(x)δb + Rˆ2(δ),
where Rˆ2(δ) denotes terms with elements in δ of higher than the second order.
Lemma 2. The update of the perturbation with the multi-step attack at step t defined in Equa-
tion (14) can be written as ∆xtmulti = α [I + αH(x)]
t−1
g(x) + Rˆt1, where g(x)
def
= ∇x`(h(x), y)
represents the gradient, andH(x)
def
= ∇2x`(h(x), y) represents the Hessian matrix. Rˆt1 denotes terms
with elements in δt−1multi of higher than the first order.
Proof. If t = 1, ∆x1multi = α · g(x).
Let ∀t′ < t,∆xt′multi = α [I + αH(x)]t
′−1
g(x) + Rˆt
′
1 , then we have
∆xtmulti = α · g(x+ δt−1multi) // According to Equation (14)
= α · g(x+ ∆x1multi + ∆x2multi + · · ·+ ∆xt−1multi) // According to Equation (15)
= α ·g
(
x+α
[
I+[I+αH(x)]+[I+αH(x)]
2
+ · · ·+[I+αH(x)]t−2
]
g(x)+
t−1∑
t′=1
Rˆt
′
1
)
,
where Rˆt
′
1 denotes terms of elements in δ
t′−1
multi of higher than the first order.
Using the Taylor series, we get
∆xtmulti = α · g(x) + α2H(x)T (x) + αH(x)
t−1∑
t′=1
Rˆt
′
1 +R
t−1
1︸ ︷︷ ︸
Rˆt1
,
(16)
where Rt−11 denotes terms with elements δ
t−1
multi of higher than the first order. T (x) in Equation (16)
is given as follows.
T (x) =
[
I + [I + αH(x)] + [I + αH(x)]
2
+ · · ·+ [I + αH(x)]t−2
]
g(x). (17)
Multiply (I + αH(x)) on both sides of Equation (17), and we get
(I + αH(x))T (x) = α ·
[
[I + αH(x)] + [I + αH(x)]
2
+ · · ·+ [I + αH(x)]t−1
]
g(x). (18)
Then, according to Equation (18) and Equation (17), we get
H(x)T (x) =
[
[I + αH(x)]
t−1 − I
]
g(x). (19)
Substituting Equation (19) back to Equation (16), we have
∆xtmulti = α [I + αH(x)]
t−1
g(x) + Rˆt1.
In this way, we have proved that ∀t ≥ 1,∆xtmulti = α [I + αH(x)]t−1 g(x) + Rˆt1.
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Proposition 1. Given an input sample x ∈ Rn and a DNN h(·) trained for classification, the
adversarial perturbation generated by the multi-step attack via gradient descent is given as δmmulti =
α
∑m−1
t=0 ∇x`(h(x+ δtmulti), y), where δtmulti denotes the perturbation after the t-th step of updating,
and m is referred to as the total number of steps. The adversarial perturbation generated by the
single-step attack is given as δsingle = αm∇x`(h(x), y). The expectation of interactions between
perturbation units in δmmulti, Ea,b[Iab(δmmulti)], is larger than Ea,b[Iab(δsingle)], i.e. Ea,b[Iab(δmmulti)] ≥
Ea,b[Iab(δsingle)].
E.1 FAIRNESS OF COMPARISONS OF INTERACTIONS INSIDE DIFFERENT PERTURBATIONS
Proposition 1 is valid for different loss functions of generating of adversarial perturbations. In this
section, we discuss the fairness of comparisons of interactions inside different perturbations.
When we compare interactions inside different perturbations, magnitudes of these perturbations
should be similar, because the comparison of interactions between adversarial perturbations of dif-
ferent magnitudes is not fair. For fair comparisons, in Section 3.1, this paper controls the magnitude
of the single-step attack by setting the step size of the single-step attack as αm, where α and m de-
notes the step size and the total number of steps of the multi-step attack, respectively. The equivalent
step size αm makes the magnitude of perturbations generated by the single-step attack to be similar
to that of perturbations generated by the multi-step attack, when we use the target score before the
softmax layer to generate adversarial perturbations, such as ˜`(h(x), y) = maxy′ 6=y h(x)−hy(x). In
this case, the magnitude of the gradient ∇x ˜`(h(x), y) is relatively stable. In particular, this type of
loss has been widely used. For example, one of the most widely used attacking (Carlini & Wagner,
2017), uses the score before the softmax layer for targeted attacking.
E.2 PROOF OF PROPOSITION 1
Proof. According to Lemma 2, the update of the perturbation with the multi-step attack at the step
t is given as follows.
∆xtmulti = α [I + αH(x)]
t−1
g(x) + Rˆt1, (20)
where Rˆt1 denotes terms with elements in δ
t−1
multi of higher than the first order, and α represents the
step size.
To simplify the notation without causing ambiguity, we write g(x) and H(x) as g and H , respec-
tively. In this way, according to Equation (15) and Equation (20), δmmulti can be written as follows.
δmmulti = α
[
I + [I + αH] + [I + αH]
2
+ · · ·+ [I + αH]m−1
]
g +
m∑
t=1
Rˆt1
= α
[
mI +
αm(m− 1)
2
H + . . .
]
g +
m∑
t=1
Rˆt1,
(21)
where m represents the total number of steps. According to Lemma 1, the Shapley interaction
between perturbation units a, b in δmmulti is given as follows.
Iab(δ
m
multi) = δ
m
multi,aHabδ
m
multi,b + Rˆ2(δ
m
multi), (22)
where Rˆ2(δmmulti) denotes terms with elements in δ
m
multi of higher than the second order.
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According to Equation (21) and Equation (22), we have
Iab(δ
m
multi) = Hab
[
αmga +
α2m(m− 1)
2
n∑
b′=1
(Hab′gb′) + · · ·+
m∑
t=1
o(δtmulti,a)︸ ︷︷ ︸
terms of δtmulti,a
of higher than the first order,
which corresponds to the term of
Rˆt1 in Equation (21)
][
αmgb +
α2m(m− 1)
2
n∑
a′=1
(Ha′bga′) + · · ·+ o(δtmulti,b)︸ ︷︷ ︸
terms of δtmulti,b
of higher than the first order,
which corresponds to the term of
Rˆt1 in Equation (21)
]
+ Rˆ2(δ
m
multi)
= α2m2gagbHab︸ ︷︷ ︸
first-order terms w.r.t. elements inH
+
[
α3(m− 1)m2
2
gb
n∑
b′=1
(Hab′gb′) +
α3(m− 1)m2
2
ga
n∑
a′=1
(Ha′bga′)
]
Hab︸ ︷︷ ︸
second-order terms w.r.t. elements inH
+
[
α4(m− 1)2m2
4
n∑
b′=1
(Hab′gb′)
n∑
a′=1
(Ha′bga′)Hab + . . .
]
︸ ︷︷ ︸
Rmulti2 (H)
+ [
m∑
t=1
o(δtmulti,a)]Habδ
m
multi,b + [
m∑
t=1
o(δtmulti,b)]Habδ
m
multi,a + Rˆ2(δ
m
multi)︸ ︷︷ ︸
Rˆ′2(δ
m
multi)
= α2m2gagbHab +
α3(m− 1)m2
2
gaHab
n∑
a′=1
(Ha′bga′)
+
α3(m− 1)m2
2
gbHab
n∑
b′=1
(Hab′gb′) + Rˆ
′
2(δ
m
multi) +Rmulti2 (H),
(23)
whereRmulti2 (H) represents terms with elements inH of higher than the second order, and Rˆ′2(δmmulti)
represents terms with elements in δmmulti of higher than the second order.
Let us consider the single-step attack. When we compare interactions inside different perturbations,
magnitudes of these perturbations should be similar, because the comparison of interactions between
adversarial perturbations of different magnitudes is not fair. For fair comparisons, in Section 3.1,
this paper controls the magnitude of the single-step attack, as follows. The single-step attack only
uses the gradient information on the original input x, which generates adversarial perturbations as:
δsingle = αmg.
Therefore, according to Lemma 1, the interaction between perturbation units a, b of δsingle is given
as follows.
Iab(δsingle) = δsingle,aHabδsingle,b + Rˆ2(δsingle)
= m2α2gagbHab + Rˆ2(δsingle),
(24)
where Rˆ2(δsingle) denotes terms with elements in δsingle of higher than the second order. In this way,
according to Equation (23) and Equation (24), the expectation of the difference between Iab(δmmulti)
and Iab(δsingle) is given as follows.
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Figure 4: (a) Histograms of the value of the Hessian element Hab(x) w.r.t. different values of
a, b. (b) Histograms of the value of gbHbb∑n
a=1 gaHab
w.r.t. different values of b. Because the Hessian
of the DNN with the ReLU activation is not well defined, we replace the ReLU activation with the
Softplus activation f(x) = 1β log(1 + e
−βx). We train VGG-16, ResNet-32, and DensetNet-121 on
the CIFAR-10 dataset (Krizhevsky et al., 2009), and use the cross-entropy loss as the classification
loss.
Ea,b [Iab(δmmulti)− Iab(δsingle)]
= Ea,b
[α3(m− 1)m2
2
gaHab
n∑
a′=1
(Ha′bga′) +
α3(m− 1)m2
2
gbHab
n∑
b′=1
(Hab′gb′)
+ Rˆ′2(δ
m
multi) +Rmulti2 (H)− Rˆ2(δsingle)
]
=
α3(m− 1)m2
2
Ea,b
gaHab
n∑
a′=1
(Ha′bga′)︸ ︷︷ ︸
Uab
+ gbHab
n∑
b′=1
(Hab′gb′)︸ ︷︷ ︸
Uba
+ Ea,b [Rab] ,
where
Rab = Rˆ
′
2(δ
m
multi) +Rmulti2 (H)− Rˆ2(δsingle).
Assumption 1: Magnitudes of elements in the Hessian matrix H(x) is small that |Hab(x)| 1,
where 1 ≤ a, b ≤ n. Therefore, Hk(x) ≈ 0, if k > 2.
We verify the assumption by directly measuring the value of Hab(x). As Fig. 4 (a) shows, the value
of Hab(x) is very small that |Hab(x)| 1.
According to Assumption 1, we have Rmulti2 (H) ≈ 0. Note that the magnitude of δmmulti and the
magnitude of δsingle are small, then Rˆ′2(δ
m
multi) ≈ 0, and R2(δsingle) ≈ 0. In this way, we have
Ea,b[Rab] = Ea,b[Rˆ′2(δmmulti) +R2(δsingle) +Rmulti2 (H)] ≈ 0.
Moreover, for the expectation of Uab, we have
Ea,b[Uab] =
1
n(n− 1)
n∑
b=1
∑
a6=b
gaHab
n∑
a′=1
(ga′Ha′b)
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Figure 5: Histograms of the value of Eb[Iab] w.r.t. different values of a
=
1
n(n− 1)
n∑
b=1


(
n∑
a=1
gaHab
)
︸ ︷︷ ︸
A
− gbHbb︸ ︷︷ ︸
B

(
n∑
a′=1
ga′Ha′b
)
︸ ︷︷ ︸
A

Let us focus on terms of A and B. Note that A is the sum of n terms (n is large). In comparisons,
B is just a single term in A. Therefore, the sign of A − B is usually dominated by the term A. In
this way, we get Prob [sign(A−B) = sign(A)] ≈ 1. Therefore, Prob [(A−B)A ≥ 0] ≈ 1. We
verify this assumption by measuring the value of gbHbb∑n
a=1 gaHab
. If Prob
[
| gbHbb∑n
a=1 gaHab
| 1
]
≈ 1,
then we have Prob [sign(A−B) = sign(A)] ≈ 1. As Fig. 4 (b) shows, the value of gbHbb∑n
a=1 gaHab
is
very small that | gbHbb∑n
a=1 gaHab
| 1. To this end, we have (A−B)B ≥ 0, and we get
Ea,b[Uab] ≥ 0 (25)
Due to the symmetry of a, b, we have Ea,b[Uba] = Ea,b[Uab]. Therefore,
Ea,b [Iab(δmulti)− Iab(δsingle)]
=
α3(m− 1)m2
2
Ea,b [Uab + Uba] + Ea,b [Rab]
≈ α3(m− 1)m2Ea,b[Uab] + 0
≥ 0.
E.3 VERIFICATION OF PROPOSITION 1
We verify that perturbations generated by the multi-step attack tend to exhibit larger interaction
than those generated by the single-step attack by measuring the value of Eb[Iab]. As shown in
Appendix F, we prove that Eb[Iab] = v(Ω)− v(Ω \ {a})− v({a}) + v(∅). Because the image data
is high-dimensional, the cost of computing Eb[Iab] is high. As Appendix G demonstrates, given the
input image, we can measure the interaction at the grid level, instead of the pixel level, to reduce
the computational cost. Therefore, we divide the input image into 16×16 (L = 16) grids, and use
Equation (28) to compute the interaction as E(p′,q′)
[
I(p,q),(p′q′)(δ)
]
= v(Λ) − v(Λ \ {Λpq}) −
v({Λpq}) + v(∅), where (p, q) denotes the coordinate of a grid. The experiments were conducted
with ImageNet validation images on ResNet-32 and DenseNet-121.
For fair comparisons, the magnitude of perturbations generated by the single-step attack is controlled
to be same as that generated by the multi-step attack. As Figure 5 (left) shows, perturbations gener-
ated by the multi-step attack tend to exhibit larger interaction than those generated by the single-step
attack.
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E.4 PERTURBATIONS GENERATED BY THE MULTI-STEP ATTACK TEND TO EXHIBIT LARGER
INTERACTION THAN GAUSSIAN NOISE
Moreover, we compare the interaction inside perturbation units generated by the multi-step attack
with the Gaussian noise perturbation. Similarly, for fair comparisons, the magnitude of the Gaussian
noise is controlled to be same as that generated by the multi-step attack. As Figure 5 (right) shows,
perturbations generated by the multi-step attack tend to exhibit larger interaction than Gaussian
noise.
F EXPECTATION OF THE SHAPLEY INTERACTION
In Equation (3), the Shapley interaction between two perturbation units i, j is given as follows.
Iij(δ) = φ(Sij |Ω \ {i, j} ∪ Sij)− (φ(i|Ω \ {j}) + φ(j|Ω \ {i})) ,
where φ(Sij |Ω \ {i, j} ∪ Sij) is the Shapley value of the singleton unit Sij = {i, j}, when pertur-
bation units i, j form a coalition. φ(i|Ω \ {j}) and φ(j|Ω \ {i}) are Shapley values of perturbation
units i, j, when these two perturbation units work individually. In this way, we can write the Shapley
interaction in a closed form as follows.
Iij(δ) =
∑
S⊆Ω\{i,j}
|S|! (n− |S|−2)!
(n− 1)! [v(S ∪ {i, j})− v(S ∪ {j})− v(S ∪ {i}) + v(S)], (26)
where ∀S ⊆ Ω, v(S) = maxy′ 6=y h(s)y′ (x+ δ(S))− h(s)y (x+ δ(S)). The expectation of interaction is
given as follows.
Ei,j [Iij(δ)] =
1
n− 1Ei [v(Ω)− v(Ω \ {i})− v({i}) + v(∅)] , (27)
which is proved as follows.
Proof. As proved in Appendix D, Iij(δ) = I ′ij(δ). Therefore, the interaction between players i and
j is given as follows.
Iij(δ) =
∑
S⊆Ω\{i,j}
|S|! (n− |S|−2)!
(n− 1)! [ [v(S ∪ {i, j})− v(S ∪ {j})]− [v(S ∪ {i})− v(S)] ]
= φj,w/ i − φj,w/o i.
The expectation of the interaction can be written as follows.
Ei,j [Iij(δ)] =
1
(n− 1)Ei
 ∑
j∈Ω\{i}
[
φj,w/ i − φj,w/o i
] .
According to the efficiency property of Shapley values (please refer to Appendix A for details):∑
j∈Ω\{i}
φj,w/ i = v(Ω)− v{i}∑
j∈Ω\{i}
φj,w/o i = v(Ω \ {i})− v(∅).
In this way,
Ei,j [Iij(δ)] =
1
n− 1Ei [v(Ω)− v(Ω \ {i})− v({i}) + v(∅)] .
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G GRID-LEVEL INTERACTIONS FOR IMAGE DATA
Although the computation of Ei,j [Iij(δ)] can be simplified using Equation (27), the computational
cost of Ei,j [Iij(δ)] is still high. Therefore, as Figure 6 shows, using the local property of images
(Chen et al., 2018a), we can divide the entire image into L × L grids, and compute interactions at
the grid level, instead of the pixel level. Let Λ = {Λ11,Λ12, . . . ,ΛLL} denote the set of grids. We
use (p, q) to denote the coordinate of a grid. In this way, the expectation of interactions between
perturbation grids is given as follows.
E(p,q),(p′,q′)
[
I(p,q),(p′q′)(δ)
]
=
1
L2 − 1E(p,q) [v(Λ)− v(Λ \ {Λpq})− v({Λpq}) + v(∅)] , (28)
Λ𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝 for the grid (p,q)
Figure 6: For the input image, we can divide the image into grids, and compute interactions at the
grid level.
H DETAILS OF OBSERVING THE NEGATIVE CORRELATION BETWEEN THE
TRANSFERABILITY AND THE INTERACTION
In Section 3.2, we directly measure the transfer utility and interactions of different adversarial
perturbations. Here, we give more details of the experiments. We measure the transfer utility as
Transfer Utility = [maxy′ 6=y h
(t)
y′ (x + δ) − h(t)y (x + δ)] − [maxy′ 6=y h(t)y′ (x) − h(t)y (x)]. We mea-
sure the interaction as Ei,j [Iij(δ)] = 1n−1Ei [v(Ω)− v(Ω \ {i})− v({i}) + v(∅)]. As Appendix G
demonstrates, to reduce the computational cost, given the input image, we can measure the interac-
tion at the grid level, instead of the pixel level. Therefore, we divide the input image into 16×16
(L = 16) grids, and use Equation (28) to compute the interaction as E(p,q),(p′,q′)
[
I(p,q),(p′q′)(δ)
]
=
1
L2−1E(p,q) [v(Λ)− v(Λ \ {Λpq})− v({Λpq}) + v(∅)], where (p, q) denotes the coordinate of a
grid.
Using the validation set of the ImageNet dataset (Russakovsky et al., 2015), we generate adversarial
perturbations on four types of DNNs, including ResNet-34/152(RN-34/152) (He et al., 2016) and
DenseNet-121/201(DN-121/201) (Huang et al., 2017). We transfer adversarial perturbations gener-
ated on each ResNet to DenseNets. Similarly, we also transfer adversarial perturbations generated
on each DenseNet to ResNets. Given an input image x, adversarial perturbations are generated using
Equation (8), i.e. minδ −`(h(x + δ), y) + c · ‖δ‖pp s.t. x + δ ∈ [0, 1]n, where c ∈ R is a scalar
constant. In this way, we gradually change the value of c as different hyper-parameters to generate
different adversarial perturbations. For fair comparisons, we need to ensure adversarial perturba-
tions generated with different hyper-parameters c to be comparable with each other. Thus, we select
a constant τ and let ‖δ‖2= τ as the stopping criteria of all adversarial attacks. We set the number
of steps as 1000. The threshold τ is set to ensure that attacks with different hyper-parameters τ are
almost converged when the L2 norm of the perturbation ‖δ‖2 reaches τ .
I PROOF OF PROPOSITION 2
To simplify the problem setting, we do not consider some tricks in adversarial attacking, such as
gradient normalization and the clip operation. In VR attack (Wu et al., 2018) , the final perturbation
generated after t steps is given as follows.
δtvr
def
= α
t−1∑
t′=0
∇x ˆ`(h(x+ δt′vr), y),
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where
ˆ`(h(x), y) = Eξ∼N (0,σ2I) [`(h(x+ ξ), y)] . (29)
According to Equation (29), the gradient and the Hessian matrix of ˆ`(h(x), y) is given as follows.
gˆ(x) = ∇x ˆ`(h(x), y)
= Eξ∼N (0,σ2I) [∇x`(h(x+ ξ), y)] ,
Hˆ(x) = ∇2x ˆ`(h(x), y)
= Eξ∼N (0,σ2I)
[∇2x`(h(x+ ξ), y)] .
(30)
where α represents the step size.
Lemma 3. Given the Gaussian smoothed loss ˆ`(x) = Eξ∼N (0,σ2I) [`(h(x), y)],
where `(h(x), y) is the original classification loss, ∀a 6= b,∀c 6= a, we have
Ex
[
gˆ2a(x)Hˆ
2
ab(x)− g2a(x)H2ab(x)
]
≤ 0, Ex
[
gˆa(x)gˆb(x)Hˆab(x)− ga(x)gb(x)Hab(x)
]
= 0,
and Ex
[
gˆa(x)gˆc(x)Hˆab(x)Hˆcb(x)− ga(x)gc(x)Hab(x)Hcb(x)
]
= 0.
Proof. According to Equation (30), we have
gˆa(x) = Eξ∼N (0,σ2I) [ga(x+ ξ)] = Ex′∼N (x,σ2I) [ga(x′)] ,
Hˆab(x) = Eξ∼N (0,σ2I)
[
∂ga(x+ ξ)
∂xb
]
= Ex′∼N (x,σ2I)
[
∂ga(x
′)
∂xb
]
= Ex′∼N (x,σ2I)[Hab(x′)].
This indicates that the gradient and the Hessian matrix in the VR attack are both smoothed by
the Gaussian noise. Because the Lipschitz constants of ga(x) and Hab(x) are usually limited to a
certain range, we can ignore the tiny probability of large gradients and large elements in the Hessian
matrix, and roughly assume that ga(x) ∼ N (gˆa(x), σ2ga), and Hab(x) ∼ N (Hˆab(x), σ2Hab), where
σga , σHab ∈ R are tow constants denoting the standard deviation. Thus, ga(x) and Hab(x) can be
written as follows.
ga(x) = gˆa(x) + ga , ga ∼ N (0, σ2ga),
Hab(x) = Hˆab(x) + Hab , Hab ∼ N (0, σ2Hab). (31)
To simplify the notation without causing ambiguity, we write gˆ(x) and Hˆ(x) as gˆ and Hˆ , respec-
tively. Moreover, we write g(x) and H(x) as g and H , respectively. In this way, we have
Ex
[
gˆ2aHˆ
2
ab − g2aH2ab
]
= ExEga ,Hab
[
gˆ2aHˆ
2
ab − (gˆa + ga)2(Hˆab + Hab)2
]
= −ExEga ,Hab
[
2gaHˆ
2
ab + 
2
Hab
(gˆa + ga)
2 + 2ga gˆaHˆab + 2HabHˆab(gˆa + ga)
2
]
≤ −ExEga ,Hab
[
2ga gˆaHˆab + 2HabHˆab(gˆa + ga)
2
]
= −Ex
{
Ega [ga ] 2gˆaHˆab + Ega
[
EHab [Hab ]2Hˆab(gˆa + ga)
2
]}
= −Ex
{
0 · 2gˆaHˆab + Ega
[
0 · 2Hˆab(gˆa + ga)2
]}
= 0.
According to Equation (31), we have ga = gˆa + ga , gb = gˆb + gb . Thus, we have
Ex
[
gˆagˆbHˆab − gagbHab
]
= Ex
[
gˆa(x)gˆbHˆab − (gˆa + ga)(gˆb + gb)(Hˆab + Hab)
]
24
preprint
= −Ex,ga ,ga ,Hab
[
gagbH + gagbHˆab + gbHab gˆa
+ Habga gˆb + gb gˆbHˆab + gb gˆaHˆab + Hab gˆagˆb
]
= −Ex
[
Ega [ga ]Egb [gb ]EHab [H ] + Ega [ga ]Egb [gb ]Hˆab + Egb [gb ]EHab [Hab ]gˆa
+ EHab [Hab ]Ega [ga ]gˆb + Ega [ga ]gˆbHˆab + Egb [gb ]gˆaHˆab + EHab [Hab ]gˆagˆb
]
= −Ex
[
0 · 0 · 0 + 0 · 0 · Hˆab + 0 · 0 · gˆa + 0 · 0 · gˆb + 0 · gˆbHˆab + 0 · gˆaHˆab + 0 · gˆagˆb
]
= 0.
Moreover, according to Equation (31), we have
Ex
[
gˆagˆcHˆabHˆcb − gagcHabHcb
]
= Ex,ga ,gc ,Hab ,Hcb
[
gˆagˆcHˆabHˆcb − (gˆa + ga)(gˆc + gc)(Hˆab + Hab)(Hˆcb + Hcb)
]
= −Ex,ga ,gc ,Hab ,Hcb
[
gagcHabHcb
+ gcHabHcb gˆa + gaHabHcb gˆc + gagcHcbHˆab + gagcHabHˆcb
+ gagcHˆabHˆcb + gaHab gˆcHˆcb + gaHcb gˆcHˆab
+ gcHab gˆaHˆcb + gcHcb gˆaHˆab + HabHcb gˆagˆc
+ ga gˆcHˆabHˆcb + gc gˆaHˆabHˆcb + Hab gˆagˆcHˆcb + Hcb gˆagˆcHˆab
]
= −Ex
[
Ega [ga ]Egc [gc ]EHab [Hab ]EHcb [Hcb ] + Egc [gc ]EHab [Hab ]EHcb [Hcb ]gˆa
+ Ega [ga ]EHab [Hab ]EHcb [Hcb ]gˆc + Ega [ga ]Egc [gc ]EHcb [Hcb ]Hˆab
+ Ega [ga ]Egc [gc ]EHab [Hab ]Hˆcb
+ Ega [ga ]Egc [gc ]HˆabHˆcb + Ega [ga ]EHab Hab gˆcHˆcb + Ega [ga ]EHcb [Hcb ]gˆcHˆab
+ Egc [gc ]EHab [Hab ]gˆaHˆcb + Egc [gc ]EHcb [Hcb ]gˆaHˆab + EHab [Hab ]EHcb [Hcb ]gˆagˆc
+ Ega [ga ]gˆcHˆabHˆcb + Egc [gc ]gˆaHˆabHˆcb + EHab [Hab ]gˆagˆcHˆcb + EHcb [Hcb ]gˆagˆcHˆab
]
= −Ex
[
0 + 0 · gˆa + 0 · gˆc + 0 · Hˆab + 0 · Hˆcb
+ 0 · HˆabHˆcb + 0 · gˆcHˆcb + 0 · gˆcHˆab + 0 · gˆaHˆcb + 0 · gˆaHˆab + 0 · gˆagˆc
+ 0 · gˆcHˆabHˆcb + 0 · gˆaHˆabHˆcb + 0 · gˆagˆcHˆcb + 0 · gˆagˆcHˆab
]
= 0.
Proposition 2. Given an input image x ∈ Rn and a DNN h(·) trained for classification, the ad-
versarial perturbation generated by multi-step attack is denoted by δmmulti = α
∑m−1
t=0 ∇x`(h(x +
δtmulti), y). The adversarial perturbation generated by VR Attack is denoted by δ
m
vr =
α
∑m−1
t=0 ∇x ˆ`(h(x + δtvr), y), where ˆ`(h(x + δtvr), y) = Eξ∼N (0,σ2I) [`(h(x+ δtvr + ξ), y)]. Per-
turbation units of δmvr tend to exhibit smaller interaction than δ
m
multi, i.e. ExEa, b[Iab(δmvr )] ≤
ExEa, b[Iab(δmmulti)].
Proof. To simplify the notation without causing ambiguity, we write gˆ(x) and Hˆ(x) as gˆ and Hˆ ,
respectively. Moreover, we write g(x) and H(x) as g and H , respectively.
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Just like the conclusion in Equation (23), we can write the interaction between δmvr,a and δ
m
vr,b as
follows.
Iab(δ
m
vr ) = α
2m2gˆagˆbHˆab +
α3(m− 1)m2
2
gˆaHˆab
n∑
a′=1
(Hˆa′bgˆa′)
+
α3(m− 1)m2
2
gˆbHˆab
n∑
b′=1
(Hˆab′ gˆb′) + Rˆ
vr
2 (δ
m
vr ) +Rvr2 (Hˆ),
(32)
where α denotes the step size, and m denotes the total number of steps. To enable fair comparisons,
we use the same step size α and number of steps m as multi-step attack to make the magnitude of
δvr match the magnitude of δmulti. Rvr2 (Hˆ) represents terms with elements in Hˆ of higher than the
second order, and Rˆvr2 (δ
m
vr ) represents terms with elements in δ
m
vr of higher than the second order.
In this way, according to Equation (32) and Equation (23), the expectation of the difference between
Iab(δ
m
vr ) and Iab(δ
m
multi) is given as follows.
ExEa,b [Iab(δvr)− Iab(δmulti)]
=
α3(m− 1)m2
2
Ea,b
{
Ex
[[
gˆ2aHˆ
2
ab − g2aH2ab
]
+
[
gˆ2b Hˆ
2
ab − g2bH2ab
]]}
+ Ea,bEx[Rvrab],
where
Rvrab =
α3(m− 1)m2
2

∑
a′∈{1,2,...,n}\{a}
[
(gˆagˆa′HˆabHˆa′b − gaga′HabHa′b)
]
︸ ︷︷ ︸
Vab
+
∑
b′∈{1,2,...,n}\{b}
[
(gˆbgˆb′HˆabHˆab′ − gbgb′HabHab′)
]
︸ ︷︷ ︸
Vba

+ α2m2
[
gˆagˆbHˆab − gagbHab
]
+ Rˆvr2 (δ
m
vr )− Rˆ′2(δmmulti) +Rvr2 (H)−Rmulti2 (H)
The expectation of Rvrab is give as follows.
ExEa,b[Rvrab]
=
α3(m− 1)m2
2
{
Ea,b
[
Ex[Vab] + Ex[Vba] +
2
α(m− 1)Ex
[
gˆagˆbHˆab − gagbHab
]]}
+ ExEa,b[Rˆvr2 (δmvr )− Rˆ′2(δmmulti) +Rvr2 (H)−Rmulti2 (H)] ≈ 0.
According to Assumption 1, we have Rvr2 (H) ≈ 0, and Rmulti2 (H) ≈ 0. Note that the magnitude
of δmmi and the magnitude of δmulti are small, then Rˆ
′
2(δ
m
vr ) ≈ 0, and R2(δmmulti) ≈ 0. According to
Lemma 3, we have Ex
[
gˆagˆbHˆab − gagbHab
]
= 0, Ex
[
(gˆagˆa′HˆabHˆa′b − gaga′HabHa′b)
]
= 0.
Therefore, we get Ex [Vab] = 0. In this way, ExEa,b[Rvrab] ≈ 0.
Furthermore, according to Lemma 3, we have Ex
[
gˆ2aHˆ
2
ab
]
− Ex
[
g2aH
2
ab
] ≤ 0.
Therefore,
ExEa,b [Iab(δvr)− Iab(δmulti)]
=
α3(m− 1)m2
2
Ea,b
{
Ex
[
gˆ2aHˆ
2
ab − g2aH2ab
]
+ Ex
[
gˆ2b Hˆ
2
ab − g2bH2ab
]}
+ ExEa,b[Rvrab]
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≈ α
3(m− 1)m2
2
Ea,b
{
Ex
[
gˆ2aHˆ
2
ab − g2aH2ab
]
+ Ex
[
gˆ2b Hˆ
2
ab − g2bH2ab
]}
+ 0
≤ 0
J PROOF OF PROPOSITION 3
To simplify the problem setting, we do not consider some tricks in adversarial attacking, such as
gradient normalization and the clip operation. Note that the original MI Attack and the multi-step
attack cannot be directly compared, since that magnitudes of the generated perturbations cannot be
fairly controlled. The value of interactions is sensitive to the magnitude of perturbations. Comparing
perturbations with different magnitudes is not fair. Thus, we slightly revise the MI Attack as
gtmi
def
= µgt−1mi + (1− µ)∇x`(h(x+ δt−1mi ), y), (33)
where t denotes the step and µ = (t− 1)/t. `(h(x), y) is referred as the classification loss. To
simplify the notation, we use g(x) to denote∇x`(h(x), y), i.e. g(x)def= ∇x`(h(x), y).
In MI attack, the final perturbation generated after t steps is given as follows.
δtmi
def
= α
t−1∑
t′=0
gt
′
mi,
where α represents the step size.
Furthermore, we define the update of perturbation with the MI attack at each step t as follows.
∆xtmi
def
= α · gtmi. (34)
In this way, the perturbation can be written as follows.
δtmi = ∆x
1
mi + ∆x
2
mi + · · ·+ ∆xt−1mi . (35)
Lemma 4. The update of the perturbation with the MI attack at step t defined in Equation (34)
can be written as ∆xtmi = α
[
I + α t−12 H(x) +Rt1(H(x))
]
g(x) + R˜t1, where Rt1(H(x)) denotes
terms of elements in H(x) higher than the first order, and R˜t1 denotes terms with elements in δ
t−1
mi
of higher than the first order.
Proof. If t = 1, ∆x1mi = α · g(x).
Let ∀t′ < t, ∆xt′mi = α
[
I + α t
′−1
2 H(x) +R
t′
1 (H(x))
]
g(x) + R˜t
′
1 .
According to Equation (33) and Equation (34), we have
∆xtmi = α ·
[
t− 1
t
gt−1mi +
1
t
g(x+ δt−1mi )
]
.
Applying the Taylor series to the term of g(x+ δt−1mi ), we get
(36)∆xtmi = α ·
[
t− 1
t
gt−1mi +
1
t
[
g(x) +H(x)δt−1mi )
]
+ rt−11
]
,
where rt−11 denotes terms of elements in δ
t−1
mi of higher than the first order.
According to Equation (35) and Equation (36), we get
∆xtmi = α ·
{
t− 1
t
gt−1mi +
1
t
[
g(x) +H(x)
[
∆x1mi + ∆x
2
mi + · · ·+ ∆xt−1mi
]]
+ rt−11
}
.
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Because ∀t′ < t ∆xt′mi = α
[
I + α t
′−1
2 H(x) +Rt
′
1 (H(x))
]
g(x) + R˜t
′
1 , we have ∆x
t−1
mi =
α · [I + α t−22 H(x) +Rt−11 (H(x))] g(x) + R˜t−12 . According to Equation (34), we get gt−1mi =[
I + α t−22 H(x) +Rt−11 (H(x))
]
g(x) + R˜t−12 .
In this way, we get
∆xtmi = α ·
{
t− 1
t
[
I + α
t− 2
2
H(x) +Rt−11 (H(x))
]
g(x)
+
1
t
[
I +H(x)
[
α(t− 1) + α (t− 2)(t− 1)
4
H(x) +
t−1∑
t′=1
Rt′1 (H(x))
]
g(x) +
t−1∑
t′=1
R˜t
′
1
]
+ rt−11
}
= α ·
 t− 1t Rt−11 (H(x)) + (t− 2)(t− 1)4t H2(x) + 1t H(x)
t−1∑
t′=1
Rt′1 (H(x))︸ ︷︷ ︸
Rt1(H(x))
+I + α
t− 1
2
H(x)+
 g(x) + 1t
t−1∑
t′=1
R˜t
′
1 + r
t−1
1︸ ︷︷ ︸
R˜t1
= α
[
I + α
t− 1
2
H(x) +Rt1(H(x))
]
g(x) + R˜t1.
where Rt1(H(x)) denotes terms of elements in H(x) higher than the first order, and R˜t1 denotes
terms with elements in δt−1mi of higher than the first order. In this way, we have proved that ∀t ≥
1,∆xtmi = α
[
I + α t−12 H(x) +Rt1(H(x))
]
g(x) + R˜t1.
Proposition 3. Given an input sample x ∈ Rn and a DNN h(·) trained for classification, the
adversarial perturbation generated by multi-step attack is denoted by δmmulti = α
∑m−1
t=0 ∇x`(h(x+
δtmulti), y). The adversarial perturbation generated by multi-step attack incorporating the momentum
is computed as δmmi = α
∑m−1
t=0 g
t
mi Perturbation units of δ
m
mi exhibit smaller interactions than δ
m
multi,
i.e. Eij [Iij(δmmi)] ≤ Eij [Iij(δmmulti)].
Proof. According to Lemma 4, the update of the perturbation with the MI attack at the step t is
given as follows.
∆xtmi = α
[
I + α
t− 1
2
H(x) +Rt1(H(x))
]
g(x) + R˜t1. (37)
whereRt1(H(x)) denotes terms of elements inH(x) of higher than the first order. R˜t1 denotes terms
with elements in δt−1mi of higher than the first order.
To simplify the notation without causing ambiguity, we write g(x) and H(x) as g and H , respec-
tively. In this way, according to Equation (35) and Equation (37), δmmi can be written as follows.
δmmi = α
[
mI +
αm(m− 1)
4
H +
m∑
t=1
Rt1(H)
]
g +
m∑
t=1
R˜t1. (38)
where m represents the total number of steps. According to Lemma 1, the Shapley interaction
between perturbation units a, b in δmmi is given as follows.
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Iab(δ
m
mi) = δ
m
mi,aHabδ
m
mi,b + R˜2(δ
m
mi), (39)
where R˜2(δmmi) denotes terms with elements in δmi of higher than the second order.
According to Equation (38) and Equation (39), we get
Iab(δ
m
mi) = Hab[αmga +
α2m(m− 1)
4
n∑
b′=1
(Hab′gb′) + · · ·+
m∑
t=1
o(δtmi,a)︸ ︷︷ ︸
terms of δtmi,a
of higher than the first order,
which corresponds to the term of
R˜t1 in Equation (38)
][
αmgb +
α2m(m− 1)
4
n∑
a′=1
(Ha′bga′) + · · ·+
m∑
t=1
o(δtmi,b)︸ ︷︷ ︸
terms of δtmi,b
of higher than the first order,
which corresponds to the term of
R˜t1 in Equation (38)
] + R˜2(δ
m
mi)
= α2m2gagbHab︸ ︷︷ ︸
first-order terms w.r.t. elements inH
+
[
α3(m− 1)m2
4
gb
n∑
b′=1
(Hab′gb′) +
α3(m− 1)m2
4
ga
n∑
a′=1
(Ha′bga′)
]
Hab︸ ︷︷ ︸
second-order terms w.r.t. elements inH
+
[
α4(m− 1)2m2
16
n∑
b′=1
(Hab′gb′)
n∑
a′=1
(Ha′bga′)Hab + . . .
]
︸ ︷︷ ︸
Rmi2 (H)
+ [
m∑
t=1
o(δtmi,a)]Habδ
m
mi,b + [o(δ
t
mi,b)]Habδ
m
mi,a + R˜2(δ
m
mi)︸ ︷︷ ︸
R˜′2(δ
m
mi )
= α2m2gagbHab +
α3(m− 1)m2
4
gaHab
n∑
a′=1
(Ha′bga′)
+
α3(m− 1)m2
4
gbHab
n∑
b′=1
(Hab′gb′) + R˜
′
2(δ
m
mi) +Rmi2 (H),
(40)
where Rmi2 (H) denotes terms of elements in H higher than the second order, and R˜′2(δmmi) denotes
terms of elements in δmmi higher than the second order
According to Equation (23) and Equation (40), the expectation of the difference between Iab(δmmi)
and Iab(δmmulti) is given as follows.
Ea,b [Iab(δmmi)− Iab(δmmulti)]
= −α
3(m− 1)m2
4
Ea,b
[
gaHab
n∑
a′=1
(Ha′bga′)︸ ︷︷ ︸
Uab
+ gbHab
n∑
b′=1
(Hab′gb′)︸ ︷︷ ︸
Uba
]
+ Ea,b
[
Rmiab
]
,
where
Rmiab = R˜
′
2(δ
m
mi)− R˜′2(δmmulti) +Rmi2 (H)−Rmulti2 (H).
According to Assumption 1, we have Rmi2 (H) ≈ 0, and Rmulti2 (H) ≈ 0. Note that the magnitude
of δmmi and the magnitude of δ
m
multi are small, then R˜
′
2(δ
m
mi) ≈ 0, and R2(δmmulti) ≈ 0. Therefore,
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best transferability
Figure 7: The curve of transferability in different steps.
Image Interactions w/o interaction loss with interaction loss Image
Interactions 
w/o interaction loss with interaction loss Image
Interactions 
w/o interaction loss with interaction loss
Figure 8: Visualization of interactions between neighboring perturbation units generated with and
without the interaction loss. The color in the visualization is computed as color[i] ∝ Ej∈Ni [Iij(δ)],
where Ni denotes the set of adjacent perturbation units of the perturbation unit i. Here, we ignore
interactions between non-adjacent units to simplify the visualization. It is because adjacent units
usually encode much more significant interactions than other units. The interaction loss forces the
perturbation to encode more negative interactions.
Ea,b
[
Rmiab
]
= Ea,b[Rˆ′2(δmmi) − R˜′2(δmmulti) +Rmi2 (H) −Rmulti2 (H)] ≈ 0. Moreover, similar to Equa-
tion (25) in the proof of Proposition 1, we have Ea,b [Uab] = Ea,b [Uba] ≥ 0.
Therefore,
Ea,b [Iab(δmi)− Iab(δmulti)]
= −α
3(m− 1)m2
4
Ea,b [Uab + Uba] + Ea,b
[
Rmiab
]
≈ −α
3(m− 1)m2
2
Ea,b [Uab] + 0 ≤ 0.
Note that Proposition 3 just shows the revised MI Attack usually decreases the interaction between
perturbation units. The proof towards all types of MI Attacks is still a challenge.
K ADDITIONAL RELATED WORK
Some studies paid attention to intermediate features to improve transferability. Activation At-
tack (Inkawhich et al., 2019) forced the intermediate features of the input image to be similar with
the intermediate features of a target image, in order to generate highly transferable targeted example.
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Distribution Attack (Inkawhich et al., 2020) explicitly modeled the feature distribution of each class,
and improve the targeted transferability by driving the feature of perturbed input image into the dis-
tribution of a specific target class. Intermediate Level Attack (Huang et al., 2019) improved the
transferability of an adversarial example by maximizing the feature perturbation of a pre-specified
layer. In comparison, we explain and improve the transferability based on game theory. Moreover,
we discover the negative correlation between the transferability and interactions.
L IMPLEMENTATION OF THE INTERACTION-REDUCED ATTACK (IRA)
As Appendix G mentions, to reduce the computational cost, we can measure interactions between
grids, instead of input units (pixels). We divide the entire input image x into L × L grids, denoted
by Λ = {Λ11,Λ12, . . . ,ΛLL}. Moreover, we use a sampling method to further reduce the compu-
tational cost in a batch manner. In each batch, we approximate the expectation of the interaction as
follows.
E(p,q),(p′,q′)[I(p,q),(p′,q′)(δ)]
=
1
L2 − 1E(p,q)[v(Λ)− v(Λ \ {Λpq})− v({Λpq}) + v(∅)]
=
1
L2 − 1EbatchE(p,q)∈batch[v(Λ)− v(Λ \ {Λpq})− v({Λpq}) + v(∅)]
≈ 1
L2 − 1Ebatch[v(Λ)− v(Λ \ Λbatch)− v(Λbatch) + v(∅)] \\batchsize L
2
(41)
In this way, Equation (5) can be approximated as
`(h(x+ δ), y)− λ · 1
K
K∑
k=1
[v(Λ)− v(Λ \ Λbatch)− v(Λbatch) + v(∅)] (42)
where K denotes the sampling times, and Λbatch ⊆ Λ is a random set with batchsize grids. As a
toy example, Λbatch = {Λ11,Λ35,Λ97} has batchsize = 3. In our experiments, we set L = 16,
K = 32, and batchsize = 32. Note that we omit the constant 1L2−1 in the interaction loss for
simplicity.
M EVALUATION OF THE TRANSFERABILITY VIA LEAVE-ONE-OUT
VALIDATION
As Fig. 7 shows, the highest transferability of the MI Attack is achieved in an intermediate step,
rather than in the last step. This phenomenon presents a challenge for fair comparisons of the
transferability between different attacking methods.
To this end, in order to enable fair comparisons of transferability between different methods, we
estimate the adversarial perturbations with the highest transferability for each input image via the
leave-one-out (LOO) validation as follows. Given a set of clean examples {(xi, yi)}Ni=1, where
yi ∈ {1, 2, . . . , C}, we use xti to denote the adversarial example at step t w.r.t. the clean ex-
ample xi, where t ∈ {1, 2, . . . , T}, and T is the number of total step. Given a target DNN
h(·) and an input example x, where h(·) denotes the output before the softmax layer, we use
C(x) = arg maxk hk(x), k ∈ {1, . . . , C} to denote the prediction of the example x.
xˆi
def
= x
t∗i
i , s.t. t
∗
i = arg max
t
Ei′∈{1,2,...,N}\{i}
[
1[C(xti′) 6= yi′ ]
]
,
where 1[·] is the indicator function. Then the average transferability is given as follows.
Transferability = Ei [1[C(xˆi) 6= yi]] .
N ADDITIONAL VISUALIZATIONS OF INTERACTIONS
Figure 2 visualizes interactions between adjacent perturbation units generated with and without the
interaction loss. Here, Figure 8 provides more visualization results of interactions between adjacent
perturbation units.
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